China has been working secretly with its Diaspora to gather information and spread its influence around the world, and it’s using members of its own overseas community to do so. This effort isn’t always about high-tech hacking or stealing military secrets. Instead, it can be subtle, involving personal favors, pressure, or even blackmail.
The Chinese government has a special strategy to tap into the millions of Chinese people living abroad. These individuals—business owners, students, or even community leaders—are often well-connected in their adopted countries. Many of them genuinely support China’s leadership or feel pressured to cooperate to protect their families back home. In other cases, they are lured into secret deals with promises of money, gifts, or the chance to reunite with loved ones in China.
These operations are typically handled by a branch of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) called the United Front Work Department. This department’s job is to increase China’s power and influence overseas. By targeting people within the Chinese diaspora, the CCP is able to gather sensitive information, spread propaganda, and sometimes even silence critics.
Diaspora Crossing the Line from Loyalty to Espionage
There’s nothing wrong with someone feeling proud of their heritage or supporting their home country. But the situation becomes dangerous when these individuals work directly for the Chinese government, especially when their actions are hidden.
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Chinese hometown associations, known as tongxianghui, are one example of how this works. These groups bring together people from the same region of China who now live abroad. While many of these associations focus on cultural events or helping immigrants settle in, others are used for political purposes. Leaders of these groups sometimes organize protests against critics of China or support events that promote the Chinese government’s agenda.
What makes it illegal is when these diaspora leaders receive secret instructions or funding from Chinese officials. For example, in one case in the United States, a leader of such an association was arrested for helping Chinese police locate and intimidate a person living abroad who was critical of the CCP. In another instance, a man helped operate a secret “police station” in New York to monitor Chinese citizens and pressure them to return to China.
These cases show how China uses fear, loyalty, and financial incentives to turn members of its diaspora into tools for its agenda.
The Cost of Bribery and Blackmail
One of the most effective ways the Chinese government recruits people is through a combination of bribery and blackmail. For instance, some individuals agree to work for China because they want to protect their families back home or because they hope to visit their parents without fear of arrest. Others are bribed with money, expensive gifts, or favors that make their lives easier.
A common example of this is how some individuals block actions that might embarrass China. This could include stopping events that highlight human rights abuses, removing references to Taiwan in official communications, or making sure pro-China narratives dominate local discussions.
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Sometimes the pressure is more personal. People might be threatened with harm to their relatives in China if they don’t cooperate. This fear makes it easier for the CCP to control them. In other cases, individuals are caught up in illegal activities and are blackmailed into spying to avoid punishment.
It’s not just individuals who are targeted. Community groups, businesses, and even schools with ties to China can be used to promote the CCP’s goals. The line between loyalty and espionage is often blurred, making it difficult to tell who is acting independently and who is working on behalf of the Chinese government.
A Balancing Act
America and other countries have started cracking down on these hidden influence campaigns. Laws like the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) require anyone working for a foreign government to disclose what they’re doing. The FBI has also arrested several individuals for secretly acting as agents of China.
But these efforts come with challenges. Some members of the Chinese diaspora feel unfairly targeted, fearing they’ll be seen as spies just because of their heritage. Others, however, welcome these measures as necessary steps to stop China from meddling in their lives and communities.
The quiet but powerful methods China uses to turn its citizens abroad into spies reveal the lengths it will go to extend its influence. From bribery to blackmail, the tactics are complex, but the goal is clear: to use people and groups in subtle ways to help the CCP strengthen its grip on power and control.
