In a new investigation, there are shocking revelations about how Russia continues to rely on foreign technology for its military projects, even after years of trying to reduce its dependence on the West. The key to this story is a Russian company called Micropribor, which is located in the village of Konakovo near the city of Tver. This company is involved in making important parts for the Sukhoi Su-57 fighter jet, one of Russia’s most advanced military planes. Despite Russia’s claims that it is becoming self-sufficient in its defense industry, evidence shows that the country is still relying heavily on machinery and equipment from Western countries.
Western Machinery Behind Russian Fighter Jets
Micropribor plays an essential role in the production of electronics for Russia’s fighter jets, especially the Su-57. This aircraft is meant to be a symbol of Russia’s military strength and advanced technology. However, analysts have discovered that without foreign-made parts, this fighter jet couldn’t be built. Even though Russia claims it’s working hard to cut ties with the West and produce all its own equipment, the truth is different.
Documents leaked by a group called Cyber Resistance reveal that Micropribor is using foreign equipment from countries like Germany, Taiwan, and the United States to build the parts it needs. These machines are used to create highly precise components for military equipment. For example, the plant is using advanced machines made by companies from countries that are supposed to be under sanctions. These include companies like Siemens from Germany and Long Chang Machinery from Taiwan.
What’s even more concerning is that some of the most modern machines at Micropribor are less than five years old, and almost all of them come from foreign companies. For instance, Micropribor uses advanced precision milling machines and spectrum analyzers made by companies from Germany and Taiwan, which are crucial for making the electronics that go into the Su-57 fighter jet.
How Russia Gets Around Sanctions
Despite sanctions placed on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine, these machines continue to make their way into Russia’s defense industry. This is happening because Russia has found ways to get around these restrictions by using intermediaries. For example, the company Micropribor bought some of its machinery from Chinese suppliers. But the twist is that many of these Chinese machines are not entirely made in China. In fact, most of the parts in these machines are sourced from Taiwan, which shows how even countries that are enemies in politics can still cooperate in trade.
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One example of this is a machine called the KLE 360 CNC lathe. This machine was purchased from a company that operates in Russia, but the components inside it come from Taiwan and use software from Siemens in Germany. The fact that Russia continues to buy equipment that depends on foreign parts proves that, despite its government’s public efforts to become independent, the Russian defense industry remains highly dependent on Western and Taiwanese technology.
The biggest surprise is how the Russian government promotes these transactions as examples of “import substitution,” meaning they are trying to replace foreign products with local ones. But in reality, much of the equipment still comes from abroad, and Russia is paying for these machines using Chinese yuan instead of rubles. This unusual way of settling payments shows just how much Russia is still relying on foreign suppliers, even if they pretend otherwise.
Micropribor’s Importance to Russia’s Military
Micropribor isn’t just making parts for the Su-57 fighter. The company also plays a role in building military radios and other essential equipment for the Russian army. It’s involved in making parts for the Arakhis-2 radio station, which is used by the Russian military. This means that the company’s products are not just important for fighter jets but for a variety of military technologies.
The fact that Micropribor is so heavily reliant on foreign machines to produce these critical military components is troubling. It shows that even after years of sanctions and efforts to create homegrown industries, Russia is still deeply embedded in global supply chains and depends on countries it has criticized for years. Western companies like Siemens and Rohde & Schwarz continue to play a role in supplying the technology that helps Russia build its military, despite sanctions meant to stop this very thing.
This situation also highlights the complex ways in which countries, even those with strained relationships, can still interact when it comes to business. Taiwan, for example, is a country that is politically at odds with China but still supplies key parts to machines that end up in Russian military equipment. This creates a strange web of connections that makes it harder to understand where the lines of responsibility and trade actually lie.
